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Abstract
The causes of the 2008 collapse and subsequent surge in global capital flows remain an 
open and highly controversial issue. Employing a factor model coupled with a dataset 
of high-frequency portfolio capital flows to 50 economies, the paper finds that 
common shocks – key crisis events as well as changes to global liquidity and risk – 
have exerted a large effect on capital flows both in the crisis and in the recovery. 
However, these effects have been highly heterogeneous across countries, with a large 
part of this heterogeneity being explained by differences in the quality of domestic 
institutions, country risk and the strength of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Comparing and quantifying these effects shows that common factors (“push” factors) 
were overall the main drivers of capital flows during the crisis, while country-specific 
determinants (“pull” factors) have been dominant in accounting for the dynamics of 
JEL No.: F3; F21; G11. 
Keywords: capital flows; factor model; common shocks; liquidity; risk; push factors; 
pull factors; emerging markets; advanced economies. 
global capital flows in 2009 and 2010, in particular for emerging markets. 5
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Non-technical summary 
We have witnessed massive fluctuations in global capital flows since 2005. While the 2007-08 
global financial crisis triggered strong portfolio capital flows in particular into bonds of some 
advanced economies, the 2009-10 recovery period has been marked by a surge in capital flows 
to emerging economies. Yet what has been striking about the crisis as well as the recovery is 
not only their global reach, but also the high degree of heterogeneity in capital flows, both 
across advanced economies and across emerging market economies. 
The question of what has been driving capital flows in the crisis and the recovery period 
remains highly controversial. Some have stressed the importance of “push” factors, i.e. in 
particular monetary and fiscal policies in advanced economies, as the main culprits behind this 
surge in capital flows. By contrast, others have emphasized “pull” factors, such as real 
divergences between EMEs and advanced economies (AEs), as the main driver of the current 
pattern of capital flows. In fact, this controversy has become one of the core issues of debate in 
international fora, such as the G20 which is considering a code of conduct for capital flow 
management, including the imposition of capital controls to deal with volatile capital flows. 
The paper analyzes the role of different drivers of global capital flows during the crisis and the 
subsequent recovery. The focus is on two questions: first, how important have been common, 
global shocks for capital flows? And second, how relevant have been macroeconomic policies, 
institutions and financial policies in helping countries shield themselves from such global 
shocks? The first of the questions is informative about the role of push factors, while the second 
allows gauging the relevance of pull factors. The paper’s focus is on portfolio investment flows 
at the micro level, i.e. at the level of individual investment funds (both mutual funds), across a 
broad geographic coverage of 50 countries and markets worldwide.  
The first part of the paper intends to establish a number of stylized facts about the high-
frequency dynamics of capital flows during the crisis and the recovery, which shows 
remarkably strong divergences in capital flows across countries during the crisis and 
subsequent recovery. The second part of the paper aims to explain this heterogeneity of global 
capital flows during the financial crisis and the subsequent recovery. A factor model for the 
determinants of capital flows is formulated, distinguishing between a set of common global 
shocks – with a specific emphasis on liquidity and risk shocks as well as macro news shocks – 
as well as a set of idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks on capital flows. The findings show 
that global factors account for a large share of the global capital flow pattern during the crisis. 
Importantly, the signs of the model parameters change substantially during the crisis episode. 
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the dynamics of capital flows was primarily 
driven by safe-heaven flows during the crisis. 
The third part of the paper analyses the role of potential determinants of these differences in 
sensitivity to common shocks. The findings indicate that it has been the institutional quality, 
country risk together with the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals and policies that 
explain a large share of the heterogeneity of capital flows during the crisis. By contrast, 
countries’ external (real and financial) exposure appears to have largely been irrelevant for 
understanding the global capital flow dynamics, including the retrenchment of capital during 
the crisis, in particular for emerging economies. 
The final part of the paper attempts to quantify and compare the relative importance of common 
shocks (“push” factors) and country-specific determinants (“pull” factors). The findings 
indicate that common factors were more important overall as a driver of net capital flows for 
many countries in 2005-07, as well as in particular during the 2007-08 financial crisis. 
However, in the recovery period since March 2009, common factors appear to have become 
less important as drivers of global capital flows, whereas it is domestic pull factors that have 6
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come to dominate in explaining capital flows, in particular for countries in Emerging Asia and 
Latin America. 
Putting these findings into perspective, it should be highlight that the period of 2005 to 2010 
has been in many ways extraordinary for the dynamics of global capital flows, as a period of a 
sharp contraction of capital flows, in particular to some EMEs, during the 2007-08 crisis was 
followed by an equally extraordinary surge in capital flows to EMEs. Hence an important open 
issue is whether the current dynamics of global capital flows will continue well into the future, 
and what it implies for the risk of sudden stops and capital flow reversals with all its adverse 
implications for global growth and financial stability. But in particular because it is so 
important to understand better the dynamics and risks of periods of financial stress, the findings 
of the current paper may be instructive about how future crisis may play out. 
The paper has a number of implications for economic policy and for policy-makers. On the one 
hand, financial globalization and the exposure to common global factors have made countries 
more vulnerable to external and global shocks. Yet, on the other hand, the exposure to domestic 
risks has also been a relevant factor during the crisis and thereafter, in particular those domestic 
risks related to poor macroeconomic fundamentals, policies and institutions. This implies that 
countries are far from innocent bystanders that are powerless in being exposed to volatile global 
markets, and that indeed they have tools to insulate to some extent their economies from 
adverse global shocks.
These findings have a bearing in particular on the current debate on how EMEs should deal 
with volatile capital flows. To the extent that capital flows are driven by global factors, some 
EME policy-makers have argued that this would justify the use of capital controls as well as 
policy interventions e.g. in FX markets. However, such policies may be misguided if the drivers 
of capital flows are mainly found in idiosyncratic, country-specific policies and conditions, 
which calls for policy-makers to rather focus on making their domestic economies more 
resilient by improving institutions, deepening financial markets and enhancing macroeconomic 
and maroprudential policies. 7
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-08 global financial crisis had been preceded for many years by substantial global 
imbalances in trade and capital flows. It is in particular the United States which was not only 
the origin of the financial crisis, but which had been among the economies globally relying 
most heavily on capital inflows to finance a growing trade deficit. Many observers argued 
before the crisis that such a status quo was unsustainable and that ultimately deficit countries, 
such as the United States, would see capital inflows dwindle and exchange rates and asset 
prices fall during an adjustment process. However, the crisis played out very differently, with 
capital of domestic and foreign investors flowing massively into US assets between July 2008 
and April 2009, and in particular after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Yet what has been 
striking about the crisis was not only its global reach, but also the high degree of heterogeneity 
with which it affected different countries, both among advanced economies as well as among 
emerging market economies. 
Moreover, it was not only the global transmission of the 2007-08 crisis, but also the recovery 
period since 2009 that has sparked a controversy about the drivers of global capital flows. Some 
emerging market economies (EMEs) have experienced massive portfolio capital inflows over 
the past two years, raising concerns about their viability and effects on domestic economies, 
exchange rates and capital markets. EME policy-makers have stressed the importance of “push” 
factors, i.e. in particular monetary and fiscal policies in advanced economies, as the main 
culprits behind this surge in capital flows. By contrast, others have emphasized “pull” factors, 
such as real divergences between EMEs and advanced economies (AEs), as the main driver of 
the current pattern of capital flows. In fact, this controversy has become one of the core issues 
of debate in international fora, such as the G20 which is considering a code of conduct for 
capital flow management, including the imposition of capital controls to deal with volatile 
capital flows. 
The objective of the paper is to analyze the role of different drivers of global capital flows 
during the crisis and the subsequent recovery. The focus is on two questions: first, how 
important have been common, global shocks for capital flows? And second, how relevant have 
been macroeconomic policies, institutions and financial policies in helping countries shield 
themselves from such global shocks? The first of the questions is informative about the role of 
push factors – if common global shocks explain a large part of the dynamics of global capital 
flows, then push factors are important. The second question allows gauging the relevance of 
pull factors – if capital flows are highly heterogeneous across countries, and if this differential 
pattern is accounted for by country-specific characteristics, then pull factors are relevant. 
The paper’s focus is at the micro level, i.e. at the level of individual investment funds (both 
mutual funds and hedge funds), across a broad geographic coverage of 50 countries and 
markets worldwide. The paper uses a novel dataset which stems from EPFR Global, which 
contains portfolio investment flows, allowing a distinction also between equity and bond 
portfolio investment flows. It contains weekly flows and geographic allocations by more than 
14,000 equity funds and more than 7,000 bond funds, with USD 8 trillion of capital under 
management.
The first part of the paper intends to establish a number of stylized facts about the high-
frequency dynamics of capital flows during the crisis and the recovery. The strength of EPFR 
data is not only its disaggregated information at the fund level, but crucially also the high time 
frequency. Compared to the pre-crisis period, the data shows remarkably strong divergences in 
capital flows across countries during the crisis, and more precisely a massive reallocation of 
capital from emerging markets (and a few advanced economies) to the US. The high data 
frequency allows gauging that this portfolio reallocation intensified substantially after a few 8
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key events, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 or key policy 
decisions.
The second part of the paper aims to explain this heterogeneity of global capital flows during 
the financial crisis and the subsequent recovery. A factor model for the determinants of capital 
flows is formulated, distinguishing between different factors as well as allowing for a 
distinction of drivers during non-crisis times and those during the crisis. The focus is on the 
effect of a set of common global shocks – with a specific emphasis on liquidity and risk shocks 
as well as macro news shocks – as well as a set of idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks on 
capital flows. The findings show that the global factors account for a large share of the global 
capital flow pattern during the crisis. Importantly, the signs of the model parameters change 
substantially during the crisis episode. For instance, while an increase in risk before the crisis 
was associated with capital flows out of AEs and into EMEs, this effect reversed during the 
crisis inducing a substantial reallocation of capital from many EMEs into a few AEs. A similar 
shift in coefficients is also found for other common shocks. This evidence is thus consistent 
with the hypothesis that the dynamics of capital flows was primarily driven by safe-heaven 
flows during the crisis. 
Another striking finding of the analysis is the large degree of heterogeneity with which 
different countries were affected by the same global shocks, in particular during the crisis and 
also the subsequent recovery. The third part of the paper analyses the role of potential 
determinants of these differences in sensitivity to common shocks. A distinction is made 
between macroeconomic fundamentals (growth, current account, public debt and deficits, short-
term debt, etc.), the quality of countries’ institutions and country risk, financial policies as well 
as the role of external exposure through trade and financial linkages.  
The findings indicate that it has been the institutional quality, country risk together with the 
strength of macroeconomic fundamentals and policies that explain a large share of the 
heterogeneity of capital flows during the crisis. By contrast, countries’ external (real and 
financial) exposure appears to have largely been irrelevant for understanding the global capital 
flow dynamics, including the retrenchment of capital during the crisis, in particular for 
emerging economies. 
The final part of the paper attempts to quantify and compare the relative importance of common 
shocks (“push” factors) and country-specific determinants (“pull” factors). The findings 
indicate that common factors were more important overall as a driver of net capital flows for 
many countries in 2005-07, as well as in particular during the 2007-08 financial crisis. 
However, in the recovery period since March 2009, common factors appear to have become 
less important as drivers of global capital flows, whereas it is domestic pull factors that have 
come to dominate in explaining capital flows, in particular for countries in Emerging Asia and 
Latin America.  
Putting these findings into perspective, the analysis of push factors versus pull factors as drivers 
of global capital flows in the present paper focuses on a relatively short period of time – a time 
span of about five years between end 2005 and end 2010 – while the discussion of push and 
pull factors has traditionally been made with reference to much longer cycles of capital flows. It 
is also important to highlight that this period of 2005 to 2010 has been in many ways 
extraordinary throughout for the dynamics of global capital flows, as a period of a sharp 
contraction of capital flows, in particular to some EMEs, during the 2007-08 crisis was 
followed by an equally extraordinary surge in capital flows to EMEs. Hence an important open 
issue is whether the current dynamics of global capital flows will continue well into the future, 
and what it implies for the risk of sudden stops and capital flow reversals with all its adverse 
implications for global growth and financial stability. But in particular because it is so 9
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important to understand better the dynamics and risks of periods of financial stress, the findings 
of the current paper may be instructive about how future crisis may play out. 
The paper has a number of implications for economic policy and for policy-makers. On the one 
hand, financial globalization and the exposure to common global factors have made countries 
more vulnerable to external and global shocks. Yet, on the other hand, the exposure to domestic 
risks has also been a relevant factor during the crisis and in the global capital flow surge 
thereafter, in particular those domestic risks related to poor macroeconomic fundamentals, 
policies and institutions. This implies that countries are far from innocent bystanders that are 
powerless in being exposed to volatile global markets, and that indeed they have tools to 
insulate to some extent their economies from adverse global shocks.  
These findings have a bearing in particular on the current debate on how EMEs should deal 
with volatile capital flows. To the extent that capital flows are driven by global factors, some 
EME policy-makers have argued that this would justify the use of capital controls as well as 
policy interventions e.g. in FX markets. However, such policies may be misguided if the drivers 
of capital flows are mainly found in idiosyncratic, country-specific policies and conditions, 
which calls for policy-makers to rather focus on making their domestic economies more 
resilient by improving institutions, deepening financial markets and enhancing macroeconomic 
and maroprudential policies. 
The paper is related to various strands of the literature. First, it relates to a growing literature on 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which has partly focused on the US and its policy responses (e.g. 
Calomiris 2008, Taylor 2009), while the literature on the global transmission of the crisis has 
been more limited (e.g. Blanchard, Das and Faruqee 2010, Rose and Spiegel 2011). Second, it 
links to the literature on capital flows during crises and other periods of extreme changes in 
capital flows, such as sudden stops, surges, retrenchments and capital flight.
1 A recent focus in 
this literature has been on gross capital flows. Forbes and Warnock (2010) distinguish between 
the four different types of extreme capital movements (surges, stops, flights and 
retrenchments), separating the activity by domestic and foreign residents, and their 
determinants. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010) and Broner, Didier, Erce and Schmukler (2010) 
analyze the link between gross capital flows and crises, in particular the 2007-08 episode.  
While recent work has underlined the importance of analyzing gross flows and distinguishing 
across asset classes, relatively little work so far has been undertaken on investment decisions 
and capital flows at the micro level of individual investors and funds. Notable exceptions are 
Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009), Froot and Ramadorai (2005), Hau and Rey (2008), and 
Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2010). 
A third related strand of the literature is the work on determinants of capital flows, and in 
particular the distinction between global factors and domestic factors and their transmission 
channels. There is a large literature on the global transmission of past financial crises, with a 
strong interest in the role of different channels (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon 2002, Bekaert, Harvey 
and Ng 2005; Bae et al. 2003, Karolyi 2003, Dungey et al. 2005, Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher 
and Mehl 2010). Some of this work analyze the role and mostly finds strong evidence for the 
transmission of global shocks to financial markets and capital flows (Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop 2010, Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan 2010), including shocks to liquidity 
(Brunnermeier 2009, Calvo 2009, Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri 2010). 
1 Examples of recent key papers on capital flow surges are Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) and Cardarelli, 
Elekdag and Kose (2009); on sudden stops are Calvo (1998) and Calvo, Izquierdo and Meijía (2008); and 
on capital flight are Dooley (1988) and Rothenberg and Warnock (2010). 10
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A specific angle of this literature on crisis focuses on the role of contagion, which is defined by 
most studies as transmission of shocks or crises above and beyond what domestic fundamentals 
as well as common shocks can explain. Specific examples including the implications for capital 
flows and asset prices, are Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and 
Martin (2011), Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2006) and Claessens and Forbes (2001). Bekaert, 
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2010) analyze the presence of contagion in equity markets 
during the 2007-08 financial crisis and find evidence that contagion was mostly domestic in 
nature, i.e. comovements mainly among domestic firms increased substantially. 
As to the structure of the paper, the next section presents the data and aims at establishing a 
number of stylized facts about the high-frequency dynamics of global capital flows during the 
crisis. The third section of the paper outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical findings on the determinants and the effects of common and idiosyncratic shocks on 
capital flows. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Global fund-level data and stylized facts of capital flows 
This section presents the data on which the analysis of the paper is based (section 2.1), and then 
outlines a number of key facts and characteristics of the high-frequency dynamics of global 
capital flows during and around the 2007-08 financial crisis (section 2.2). 
2.1 The data on capital flows 
The paper uses a dataset on portfolio capital flows and performance at the fund level, compiled 
by EPFR. It is a fairly novel database, which to the best of my knowledge, has so far been only 
used by one paper (Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai 2010) and in a very different context. 
It contains daily, weekly and monthly flows by more than 16,000 equity funds and more than 
8,000 bond funds; hence its focus being on different types of portfolio investment. There is 
some difference in coverage, with the data at a monthly frequency covering a somewhat larger 
number of funds. Although EPFR data captures only about 5-20% of the market capitalization 
in equity and in bonds for most countries, it is a fairly representative sample; Jotikasthira, 
Lundblad and Ramadorai (2010) make this point convincingly by showing in detail a close 
match between EPFR portfolio flows and portfolio flows stemming from total balance-of-
payments data.  
Importantly, EPFR data contains information on the total assets under management (AUM) at 
the end of each period, as well as allowing for a distinction between net capital flows (i.e. net of 
valuation changes) and valuation changes (due to asset returns and exchange rate changes) to 
calculate each period’s change in AUM. Two important points about the data construction 
relate to the definition of net flows and the domicile of investors. Net flows in the EPFR 
information is defined as the change in AUM due to active increases or reductions, abstracting 
from potential portfolio changes within each fund. Moreover, it should be stressed that the 
domiciles for most of the funds covered by EPFR are in advanced countries. Table 1 provides 
an overview of the number of funds and total AUM by fund group available in the raw EPFR 
data set. 
Table 1 
This raw data is paired down and transformed into a sample that fits the purpose of the analysis 
for the present paper. As the main focus of the paper is on portfolio capital flows across 
countries, net capital flows are aggregated at the level of each recipient country. Moreover, the 
analysis below is conducted for data at weekly frequency. Weekly frequency is preferred over 11
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data at monthly frequency, at which the effect of specific shocks and important crisis events on 
capital flows are harder to identify cleanly. Using data at a daily frequency has the drawback 
that it may not allow tracing the effect of specific shocks due to different trading times in 
different regions. Moreover, many fund managers are unlikely to make portfolio decisions at 
such high frequency. 
Some data cleaning is done to avoid that the measures of capital flows are strongly influenced 
by outliers or the emergence or disappearance of individual funds from the sample. Small funds 
with less than USD 5 million are excluded, as well as funds that record at times extreme net 
inflows or net outflows, i.e. those with weekly net inflows above 50% or below -50% of total 
assets under management (AUM). Also those funds are excluded for which no geographic 
allocations information is available, i.e. for which no sufficient information exists on the 
countries in which they are invested. 
Moreover, in order to have a stable sample of funds, the period analyzed is limited to start on 
12 October 2005 and end on 22 November 2010. Only those funds are retained which are 
continuously reporting every week throughout this sample period. This means that funds are 
excluded that either appear or disappear from the sample during this period. Although e.g. 
including in the sample a fund which closes down, e.g. at the height of the financial crisis, and 
liquidates assets in recipient countries is indeed informative, there is no way to distinguish why 
a particular fund joins or exits the data sample, which may alternatively simply be due to an 
increase or decrease in the fund coverage by EPFR. Moreover, funds that report only for part of 
this sample period constitute merely about 1% of all observations and AUM. 
A key strength of the data is the high frequency of reported flows. A second advantage is the 
broad geographic coverage which includes not only advanced economies (AEs) but many 
emerging market economies (EMEs). The allocation component of the data allows gauging 
which funds have invested in which countries and what types of assets (equities or bonds). 
Overall, to my knowledge, this data source is the most comprehensive one of international 
capital flows, in particular at higher frequencies, and in terms of its geographic coverage at the 
fund level. It is thus well suited for the objective of the paper.  
Table 2 
Table 2 provides an overview of the coverage and some summary statistics of the data sample 
derived through the above steps from the EPFR fund-level data. It covers 50 countries, a 
majority of which are EMEs. Assets under management are in the billions of US dollars for 
almost all of the countries and asset classes, while the USA clearly dominates in terms of the 
size of asset holdings. The size of equity holdings is somewhat larger than bond holdings for 
most of the countries. Most of the analysis below is based on total portfolio holdings (the sum 
of equity and bond holdings for each recipient country), though some of the analysis also makes 
an explicit split between equities and bonds. 
The middle set of columns provides an indication about the magnitude of weekly net capital 
flows, which are in absolute terms at around 0.4-0.5% of total assets under management 
(AUM). The standard deviation of weekly net flows is about 0.6%. The final two columns of 
the table show the cumulated, total net capital flows in the pre-crisis period, i.e. from 
November 2005 to August 2007, and in the crisis period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008. While cumulated net capital inflows in the pre-crisis period were on 
average around 12% and net capital outflows around 10% during the crisis, these two periods 
show a remarkable degree of heterogeneity in net capital flows across countries. The analysis of 
the empirical sections below tries in particular to understand and explain this cross-country 
heterogeneity in net capita flows. 12
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2.2  Stylized facts of high-frequency capital flows during crisis 
I now turn to the key features and stylized facts of the data, with a specific focus on the 
dynamics and heterogeneity of capital flows during the financial crisis. In particular, this sub-
section aims to draw out in more detail the cross-country heterogeneity that is already apparent 
from the aggregate data in Table 2. 
Figures 1 – 2 
Figures 1 and 2 show the high-frequency dynamics of capital flows during the financial crisis. 
The figures emphasize four key events through vertical lines: the start of the liquidity crunch on 
7 August 2007 when markets first experienced serious liquidity problems; the collapse of Bear 
Stearns on 15 March 2008; the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, and the 
intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is here dated as 15 March 2010 
though a precise timing of the latter is difficult. The figures highlight a number of striking 
stylized facts. First, they indicate the stark difference in the capital flow dynamics for advanced 
economies (AEs) and emerging market economies (EMEs). On aggregate, AEs experienced net 
capital outflows quite continuously after the start of the crisis in August 2007. In fact, net total 
portfolio outflows seemed to even have slowed initially after the Lehman collapse in September 
2008 (Figure 1.A). By contrast, net portfolio flows to EMEs were hardly adversely affected at 
the beginning of the crisis as net inflows were positive through July 2008 and only then 
dropped substantially before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and well into early 
2009. 
Second, there is a significant divergence in the dynamics of net flows between equities and 
bonds. Figure 1.B shows that net flows into bonds underwent substantially larger swings than 
net flows for equities. In fact, net holdings of AE equities remained relatively stable throughout 
the crisis, and also only declined modestly for EME equities following the Lehman collapse 
before recovering strongly in 2009. By contrast, the Lehman event triggered substantial 
outflows out of EME bonds, by about 30% (excluding valuation changes) over a span of 4-5 
months. However, investments in EME bonds subsequently recovered substantially, with AUM 
in this asset class almost doubling between March 2009 and the end of the sample in November 
2010. 
Third, there are also sharp cross-country divergences among AEs and among EMEs. Figure 2 
shows that among AEs it was mainly the US that experienced little change in either equity 
flows or bond flows during the height of the crisis. By contrast, among AEs it was mainly euro 
area countries that recorded the strongest net outflows, in particular in bonds, throughout the 
crisis. Among EMEs, EM Europe seems to have suffered the strongest by registering the largest 
net outflows and slowest recovery in both equity and bond flows throughout the crisis and 
thereafter, while Latin American economies fared better.  
Fourth, focusing on the period after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, it is striking that the 
European sovereign debt crisis of 2010 is hardly visible in the aggregate capital flows data at 
the regional level. As to EMEs, what stands out from Figure 2 is the enormous increase in net 
capital flows into EMEs since April 2009. Not only did net AUM (net of valuation changes) in 
EME equities increase by about 30-40 percentage points and in bonds almost double between 
the trough in March 2009 and the end of 2010, but total net AUM for both EME asset classes 
stood in late 2010 substantially above those before the start of the 2007-08 crisis. 13
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Figures 3 and 4 provide a more detailed break-down of net capital flows, total and by asset 
class, for the six distinct period of the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. They highlight in 
particular the difference of the three crisis sub-periods and how these differ from other sub-
periods before and after the crisis. 
Figure 5
Finally, Figure 5 shows the cross-country heterogeneity or dispersion in net capital flows, 
which is measured as the standard deviation of weekly net capital flows across countries, over a 
centered moving window of 6 months (normalized to have a mean of one for each group over 
the entire sample period). The figure indicates that capital flow dispersion was not particularly 
high within Advanced Europe or among other advanced economies e.g. during the period after 
the Lehman collapse. By contrast, net capital flows exhibited a very high degree of 
heterogeneity across EMEs during the height of the 2007-08 financial crisis. This is an 
important stylized fact because it underlines that the experience of countries with capital flows 
indeed differed markedly during the crisis.  
In summary, two key stylized facts stand out from the high-frequency portfolio flow data. First, 
there has been a massive reallocation of portfolio capital during the 2007-08 financial crisis. In 
the early period of the crisis, most advanced economies experienced net outflows while EMEs 
recorded balanced flows into the summer of 2008. The collapse of Lehman Brothers then 
reversed this trend, with capital exiting EMEs on a massive scale and repatriating to the USA 
and some other advanced economies. This pattern was much stronger for bond flows than for 
equity flows. The second key stylized fact is that despite this overall pattern in capital flows, 
the heterogeneity and dispersion in capital flows across countries increased sharply during the 
height of the financial crisis, implying that investors did not flee regions (in particular EME 
regions) indiscriminately, but that they indeed did discriminate quite closely in their investment 
decisions.
3. Empirical methodology 
The objective of the empirical analysis is to explain the global dynamics of capital flows during 
and around the 2007-08 financial crisis, and in particular the heterogeneity in capital flows 
across countries, as highlighted in the previous section.  
The empirical model to get at these questions is a factor model with two types of factors – a set 




t t S S S   , in order 
to test whether portfolio capital flows during and around the 2007-08 crisis reflected common 
shocks, domestic/idiosyncratic shocks and to what extent an increased vulnerability at the 
country level: 
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where fi,t is the net capital flow to country i during week t, Et-1[fi,t] is the expected net flows, 
measured as a function of lagged values of net flows and interest rate differentials, St is the 
vector of the observable factors, Dt a financial crisis dummy, and Zi,t a vector of determinants 
that explains differences in the factor loadings across countries. The sample period from 12 
October 2005 to 22 November 2010 has about 266 weekly observations for equity and bonds 
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flows to 50 countries. The financial crisis Dt is defined from 7 August 2007 to 15 March 2009, 
with robustness tests specifically focusing on the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
on 15 September 2008. As most of the common shocks are US variables, note that the US as a 
recipient country of capital flows is excluded from all model estimations. The factor model (1)-
(3) is in the spirit of standard asset-pricing models and related to the work by Bekaert, 
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2010), who focus on equity market contagion and equity 
returns at the firm level during the 2007-08 financial crisis. 
The first set of hypotheses to be tested relates to the coefficients on the factors (Ei,0 , Ji,0) as well 
as the role of the determinants in conjunction with these factors (E1 , J1)  on capital flows, and 
whether and how these coefficients have changed during the financial crisis. This allows us to 
understand the overall drivers and the transmission channels of the crisis. The inclusion of the 
crisis dummy in equation (2) allows for a change in the factor loadings during the crisis via J in 
equation (2). Such change in the transmission during the crisis may be either due to an 
unconditional increase in the factor loadings (Ji,0) or a change in the factor loadings conditional 
on the determinants Zi,t (J1). 
The second main hypothesis is to gauge to what extent it has been drivers associated with push 
factors – effects of factors common to all countries – and to what extent drivers related to pull 
factors – effects specific to individual countries and their own characteristics – which accounts 
for the dynamics of capital flows during the crisis and non-crisis times. 
Specifically, the contributions of push factors and of pull factors to net capital flows are derived 
from the factor model (1)-(3) in the following way: 
G
t t i i
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D
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where
G
t i f , ˆ  is the contribution of push factors due to common shocks for each country i.
D
t i f , ˆ  is 
the contribution of pull factors, which is the sum of the expected net flows, the component of 
net flows due to country-specific determinants Zi,t, and the component due to country-
specific/idiosyncratic factors. The total share of net capital flows accounted for by push factors 
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Concerning the definitions of the different variables in the empirical model (1)-(3), I first turn 
to the set of common and idiosyncratic factors St, summary statistics of which are given in 
Table 3.A. The set of common shocks St consists of specific exogenous crisis events, measures 
of global risk and liquidity, as well as US macroeconomic news and US equity market returns.  
Table 3 and Figure 6 
The level of risk may substantially increase during the crisis, making investors shun risky assets 
and flee into safer assets, in particular government bonds in the US and other advanced 
economies. I proxy for changes to risk through the VIX index of the S&P500. Moreover, a 
liquidity squeeze and the freezing of credit markets during the crisis made it difficult for 
financial and non-financial institutions to obtain capital, and thus may have been key in 15
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spreading or exacerbating the crisis (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2010, Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen 2009). I use the TED spread as a measure of liquidity.  
As to the crisis event, the objective is to identify events that were important and largely 
exogenous to the dynamics of capital flows. Table 3.B shows the list of 8 key events which 
have been integral parts of the crisis dynamics and which allow analyzing how capital flows 
have reacted in the immediate aftermath of these shocks. 
In addition, two macro news shocks are included, one for the US and one for each of the 
countries in the sample, in order to proxy developments on the real side of the economies. 
Macroeconomic news shocks are the unexpected components of announcements about key 
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, industrial production, unemployment or the trade 
balance, defined as the difference between the announced value and the expected value based 
on the median expectation expressed in Bloomberg surveys prior to the releases. Based on 9 
US-specific news, I construct a composite US macro shock, which is the weekly sum across 
these news (after standardizing each news variable to raise net capital flows into the domestic 
market by 1% in the pre-crisis period), and analogously a domestic news shock.  
Table 3.A and Figure 6.A show summary statistics for these composite macro shocks and its 
components. The advantage of using such macro “shocks” is that not only can they be 
identified cleanly and separated from other shocks – in particular as there is a time series for all 
of them, with each announcement usually taking place once a month – but equally importantly, 
using these news we can gauge how a given shock has been transmitted before versus during 
the financial crisis, and thus whether the transmission process and the transmission channels 
have changed during the crisis. Figure 6.A shows that these US macro shocks are indeed white 
noise over time – as they should be, as they are based on the unexpected components of macro 
announcements – though in some periods news tend to be more often negative, such as after the 
Lehman collapse, or positive for some time.
2
Finally, I include US equity market returns and domestic equity market returns as factors into 
the model. The inclusion of these two equity market returns into the factor model is meant to 
account for the fact that there is likely to be a relationship between flows and returns. 
A crucial issue is the exogeneity of the factors. Crisis events (such as the default by Lehman 
Brothers) and the macroeconomic news shocks should be largely exogenous to cross-border 
capital flows, in particular given the definition of the latter as unexpected components of 
announcements. Yet, US returns, the Ted spread and the VIX may be influenced by capital 
flows and other developments in one of the 50 individual countries, though all three are US-
specific variables and it is unlikely that capital flows to and from smaller economies may be 
important enough to influence US equity markets during a particular week. Hence, strictly 
speaking, the term “factor” is more appropriate than “shock” when thinking about the 
interpretations of the vector Si,t in the factor model (1)-(3). 
As a final note on the vector of common and idiosyncratic factors, some of these factors may be 
correlated with one another. I attempt to reduce this potential problem by orthogonalising VIX 
and TED spread, which is done by regressing the VIX on the TED spread and using the residual 
as a pure measure of risk. Similarly, domestic equity returns are regressed on US returns and 
the residuals used as the measure of the domestic returns. Table 3.C shows a table with 
                                                
2 A large literature using such macro news focuses on analyzing how they affect asset prices, both in the 
United States and globally. A detailed account of the construction of the news component of the 
announcements and their financial market effects are provided in Andersen et al. (2007), Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2004, 2005), and Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). The data source is Bloomberg, both 
for the announcements and for the surveys of market participants’ expectations. 16
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correlation coefficients across the different shocks, indicating the correlations across the seven 
factors are generally small. 
Table 4 
I next turn to the set of determinants Zi,t which may explain the transmission of a particular 
shock on net capital flows fi,t. Table 4 provides summary statistics with definitions and data 
sources for all of the determinants. A distinction is made between four groups of determinants. 
The first set of variables primarily measures the external exposure via trade and financial 
openness, which has been pointed out by many researchers to play a role in explaining financial 
interdependencies (see e.g. Forbes and Chinn 2004, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000, Baele and 
Inghelbrecht 2009, Bekaert and Harvey 1995). More specifically, the exposure variables 
included are trade openness (sum, of exports plus imports), the total stock of portfolio 
investment assets and the stock of portfolio investment assets (sourced from CPIS), the size of 
depth of domestic financial markets (proxied by the stock market capitalization) as well as the 
degree of de facto capital account openness (using the Chinn-Ito (2008) index). All variables, 
except the last one, are scaled by domestic GDP. 
Second, proxies for institutions and country risk are included, such as quality of political 
institutions or financial risk (using ICRG measures), as well as the sovereign rating of a 
particular country.  Third, I control for macroeconomic variables at the country level, such as a 
country’s current account position, FX reserve holdings, the performance of the economy (GDP 
growth, inflation, interest rate), and the government budget balance, public debt and short-term 
external debt.
The hypothesis for their inclusion is that countries with good institutions and strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals may be less likely to experience sharp capital flow reversals 
during the crisis. As to the transmission of shocks, the prior is that better institutions and 
fundamentals may be instrumental in insulating a country from negative external shocks and 
hence capital outflows may be smaller, or a country with strong fundamentals may even 
experience net capital inflows during the crisis as a flight-to-safety phenomenon among 
investors starts to dominate investment decisions. 
Fourth, I try to include the policy reaction of governments to the financial crisis and in 
particular their attempt to shield the domestic financial sector from the crisis. One striking 
feature of the crisis has been the massive policy response by policymakers, in particular the 
substantial financial policy interventions in the form of capital injections in both financial and 
non-financial firms, as well as broad set of new or extended deposit guarantees and debt 
guarantees in a number of countries. There is a growing literature showing that such measures 
have indeed been fairly effective in supporting individual financial institutions and even 
countries’ financial systems.
3
The hypothesis for the present paper is that these financial policy responses may have helped 
countries to be more insulated and less affected by shocks and capital retrenchment during the 
crisis. To get at this hypothesis, I investigate the effect of different types of financial policies – 
capital injections, deposit guarantees, debt guarantees, credit intervention, asset relief 
programmes and capital control measures – on the transmission process during the crisis. A key 
feature exploited for this analysis is that not all countries have seen such financial policies, and 
                                                
3 For instance, King (2009) provides an event-study analysis of the effects of such financial policies by 
governments on the stock market value of banks directly concerned. 17
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moreover there are differences in the precise measures and timing with which these were 
implemented.
4
4. Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results of the factor model. It starts by first estimating model 
(1)-(3) and outlining the findings for the effects of shocks on global capital flows (section 4.1) 
and the determinants that explain the cross-country heterogeneity in capital flows in response to 
these shocks (section 4.2). The section concludes by gauging the economic relevance of the 
various drivers associated with push and pull factors in explaining net capital flows during the 
2007-08 crisis and its subsequent recovery (section 4.3). 
4.1  Common and idiosyncratic factors as drivers of capital flows  
The first step is to estimate the model (1)-(3) with the vector of shocks St, but without the 
determinants Zi,t. Table 5 shows the results for the effect of shocks on capital flows in the non-
crisis period (Ei,0) and for the additional effect during the crisis (Ji,0) for each of the five 
common factors and two idiosyncratic factors. Recall that in model (1)-(3) Ji,0 gives the 
difference in the effect of a particular factor during the crisis, while (Ei,0 + Ji,0) provides the 
overall effect during the crisis. The reported coefficients are averages across country-specific 
coefficients as specified in equations (1)-(3). 
Table 5 
The key crisis events had a significant negative effect on capital flows, yet only for EMEs and 
not for AEs. Looking at liquidity shocks, a rise in the TED spread, i.e. a worsening in liquidity 
conditions, induces net portfolio outflows. Yet the effect was smaller during the crisis than in 
the non-crisis period. However, this should not be interpreted that liquidity shocks have become 
less important as drivers of capital flows during the crisis as the magnitude of such shocks has 
increased enormously in the crisis.
5
The response to changes in risk, as proxied by the VIX, during the crisis yields a striking result. 
While higher risk during the crisis is associated with some net portfolio outflows, there is a 
remarkable heterogeneity in the effect across country groups. While a rise in the VIX led to net 
outflows out of AEs before the crisis and into EMEs, this effect reversed during the crisis, when 
the sharp increase in global risk induced net inflows into AEs and net outflows out of EMEs. 
This suggests that the pricing of risk changed fundamentally during the crisis. The finding is 
consistent with the flight-to-safety phenomenon stressed as a key driver of global capital flows 
in the crisis. 
In the non-crisis period, a positive US macro shock induces capital outflows – presumably as 
capital is repatriated into the US – while a positive domestic macro shock leads to net capital 
inflows into the domestic economy. Yet, the sign for domestic macro shocks changes in the 
                                                
4 The information stems from a variety of data sources, mainly from the BIS. It should be noted that it is 
not only advanced economies which implemented such policies, but a number of emerging markets did 
so as well, while some advanced economies implemented no or only a few of such policy measures. The 
magnitude and coverage of such financial policies of course differ significantly across countries. To the 
extent possible, I have derived measures about the size of capital injections relative to domestic GDP. 
However, the empirical findings are qualitatively unchanged whether we use simple dummy variables or 
such ratios in the estimation. 
5 See Figure 6.B for the (normalized) evolution of the TED spread over time, showing that at times 
during the crisis the TED spread rose by 5 standard deviation relative to the whole sample period. 18
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crisis for AEs, suggesting that negative domestic shocks during the crisis triggered capital 
outflows out of EMEs but net inflows into AEs, e.g. a repatriation of capital from abroad of 
investors based in AEs. If one considers AEs as relatively saver, this finding is again consistent 
with the flight-to-safety hypothesis. This is further corroborated by the change in sign for US 
macro news, similarly indicating a repatriation of capital into the US in response to negative US 
macro shocks during the crisis. 
Finally, positive US equity returns and domestic equity returns both lead to more capital 
inflows into all economies. The coefficients do not change markedly during the crisis, 
suggesting that the transmission mechanism of asset price changes to capital flows has not 
changed materially. 
Tables 6 – 9 
Table 6 shows the coefficients of a further disaggregation by region and underlines the high 
degree of heterogeneity across countries. Among regions, it is in particular Emerging Europe 
that is most adversely affected by the global/common shocks during the crisis. By contrast, in 
response to an increase in the Ted spread or the VIX, there are net capital inflows into 
Advanced Europe, consistent with the (relative) safe-heaven pattern of global capital flows 
emphasized above. 
Table 7 provides a breakdown of portfolio flows into equity flows and bond flows. While the 
results for aggregate portfolio flows largely hold also for both asset classes, there are a few 
noteworthy differences. The first one relates to the sensitivity of flows to crisis events: the crisis 
events triggered substantial capital outflows out of equities in both advanced and emerging 
economies as well as out of EME bonds, but induced net inflows into bonds of advanced 
economies. 
As a second feature, an increase in risk during the crisis led to a particular strong response in 
the form of net outflows out of EME bonds, but to some net inflows into AE equities. In 
particular, the much stronger sensitivity of EME bond flows to risk changes (as well as to event 
shocks and increases in the Ted spread) help explain the larger net outflows out of EME bonds 
as highlighted among the stylized facts in section 2. A third feature is the opposite sign for 
domestic macro shocks between equity and bond flow, implying that for AEs before the crisis 
negative domestic macro news induced a portfolio rebalancing by shifting fund flows from 
equities into bonds. 
Table 8 gives the estimates for a robustness check in which the crisis period is reduced to 
capture only the post-Lehman period from 15 September 2008 till 14 March 2009, which was 
the period with the sharpest net capital outflows, in particular out of EMEs, as was shown in 
section 2. The findings are qualitatively similar to those of the benchmark model of Table 5, 
though capital flows are generally more sensitive during the Post-Lehman period to the various 
common and idiosyncratic shocks, suggesting that investors have reacted particular sensitively 
to new information during that period of turmoil. In particular the coefficients to liquidity 
shocks and to US macro shocks are substantially higher in the post-Lehman period. 
Another potentially important issue is whether the European sovereign debt crisis in 2009 and 
2010 has played a relevant role in the surge in capital flows to some EMEs. In other words, this 
crisis may well have functioned as a “push” factor of capital flows to EMEs. To test for this 
hypothesis formally, the benchmark model is extended to include key events of the European 
sovereign debt crisis as a separate variable.
6 The upshot of such an extension is that there 
                                                
6 These events are the first rumors about sovereign debt strains in Greece in February 2011, the first 
official Eurogroup statements acknowledging the issue in March 2010, the adverse market contraction 19
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appears to be a slight positive effect of such events on capital flows to EMEs, but the 
coefficient is neither economically nor statistically significant. As an interpretation, these 
findings suggest that European sovereign debt events of 2009-10 have not had a global 
outreach, thus neither exerting a positive nor a negative effect of portfolio flows to EMEs.
7
Table 9 provides a complementary perspective on the change in the parameters between the 
non-crisis and crisis periods. It shows the correlation coefficient between the non-crisis and 
crisis parameters for the 49 countries in the sample. What is most striking from the table is the 
strong negative correlation between non-crisis and crisis parameters for each shock (see the 
boxed cells in the table), which means e.g. that countries with large negative coefficients for 
risk shocks in the non-crisis period were those with the least negative (or most positive) 
coefficients during the crisis, and vice versa. This pattern holds across all common and 
idiosyncratic shocks. 
Figure 7 
This negative correlation implies that capital flows to countries that exhibited a high sensitivity 
to common shocks before the crisis – i.e. in many cases emerging economies in Europe, Asia 
and Latin America – also experienced the sharpest reductions or even reversals of these 
elasticities during the crisis. To shed more light on this issue, as well as to gauge the goodness 
of fit of the factor model, Figure 7 plots the actual cumulated flows during the crisis (vertical 
axis) against the fitted cumulated flows (horizontal axis) from the factor model (1)-(3). Figure 
7.A is based on the estimation of the model without crisis interaction terms (but with common 
and idiosyncratic shocks); the figure in Panel B on the model without any common shocks (but 
with crisis interaction terms); and Figure 7.C on the full model with both crisis interaction 
terms and common shocks. 
Figure 7.A highlights that the above-mentioned reduction of elasticities during the crisis was 
particularly strong for EMEs. Most EMEs lie above the 45-degree line, which means that the 
non-crisis parameters Ei predict that EMEs would have been more strongly affected and 
experienced larger capital outflows than was actually the case. By contrast, most AEs lie below 
the 45-degree line indicating that the non-crisis model under-predicted the severity with which 
AEs were actually affected by the crisis. 
However, this does not mean that common factors have become less important as overall 
drivers of capital flows during the crisis. In fact, common factors such as the Ted spread and 
the VIX have exhibited movements that were magnitudes larger during the crisis than before. 
Figure 7.B stresses this point by showing that when excluding the five common factors from 
the model (i.e. thus only including the domestic factors and the controls in factor model) the 
model does a very poor job in accounting for actual capital flows in the crisis. In fact, such a 
model strongly under-predicts the capital outflows during the crisis. Most importantly, the 
largest underprediction of such a model is for EMEs which are furthest below the 45-degree 
line.
Finally, Figure 7.C shows the model predictions with the full specification, indicating a fairly 
good fit of the model in accounting for global capital flow dynamics during the crisis, as well 
explaining well the large degree of heterogeneity in country-specific experiences with capital 
flows across the 49 countries in the sample.  
                                                                                                                               
and policy reaction of early May 2010, related market events of July 2010, and two events in September 
and October 2010 about banking sector problems in Ireland.
7 The empirical results are not shown here for brevity reasons, but are available upon request.20
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In summary, the empirical findings show that the drivers of capital flows during the crisis have 
changed substantially. While an increase in risk triggered net capital inflows into EMEs and net 
outflows out of AEs before and after the crisis, this relationship switched with the sharp rise in 
global risk during the crisis being associated with a repatriation of capital out of EMEs and into 
AEs. Also other common shocks, such as specific crisis events, a worsening in liquidity 
conditions and negative US macro news affected capital flows to EMEs more adversely than 
those to AEs. The evidence is, overall, consistent with a flight-to-safety phenomenon that has 
been widely cited in the literature as a key motivation of global capital flows during the 2007-
08 financial crisis. Moreover, the evidence shows that common, global shocks have been 
important in explaining both the magnitude as well as the cross-country heterogeneity of capital 
flows during the 2007-08 financial crisis, with such common shocks having exerted a 
particularly large effect on EMEs. 
4.2  Determinants of capital flows 
What explains the high degree of heterogeneity in capital flows across countries? And in 
particular, what accounts for the change in the sign and size of the sensitivity of countries’ 
capital flows to common and idiosyncratic shocks during the 2007-08 crisis? This section 
discusses the estimates of the factor model (1)-(3) when including the vector of instruments Zi,t.
As detailed in section 3, these instruments relate to a country’s economic fundamentals (size of 
reserves, current account position, fiscal position, growth, etc.), its institutional environment 
(sovereign risk, institutional quality), its financial policies during the crisis, and its external 
exposure (through trade and financial linkages).
8
Figure 8 
The main question is whether and which of these instruments has been important during the 
crisis as a facilitator or insulator of capital flows in response to common and idiosyncratic 
shocks. A first look at the data is quite informative. Figure 8 is based on the parameter 
estimates of the analysis of the previous sub-section, i.e. without including instruments Zi,t, and 
plots the crisis coefficients Ji,0 for the effect of the crisis events on capital flows against four 
specific instruments Zi,t for each of the 49 countries the sample. The figures show a strikingly 
strong correlation pattern. Specifically, countries with a high sovereign rating and with a good 
quality of policy institutions experience much smaller sensitivity of their net capital flows to 
adverse crisis events. 
A formal test for the role of instruments Zi,t is obtained by estimating the full factor model (1)-
(3). More specifically, for instance, as crisis events triggered overall net capital outflows during 
the crisis (a negative coefficient in Tables 6-9), then J1 > 0 for a particular instrument Zi,t
implies that a higher value of this instrument (i.e. better fundamentals or institutions, the 
implementation of financial policies or more openness/integration) helps to reduce the negative 
impact of these shocks on capital flows. The opposite is the case if the shock has a positive sign 
on capital flows overall, so that J1 > 0 means that the transmission of the shock is magnified. 
The second row of Tables 11 and 12 shows the expected signs of the coefficients for the 
instruments under the null that the instrument functions as a shock insulator or absorber, i.e. 
reduces the impact of the respective shock on capital flows.  
The estimator used is a pooled OLS, with the estimation following an encompassing strategy 
starting from a full model including all determinants Zi,t and then in a stepwise procedure 
                                                
8 Note that all instruments Zi,t are defined so that a higher value means better fundamentals, better 
institutions, the implementation of financial policies, and more trade and financial integration. This is 
helpful so that the coefficients can be more easily be interpreted across variables. 21
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excluding variables if they are not statistically significant at the 20% level, while also at each 
step testing whether already excluded variable become again statistically significant and need to 
be included. 
Tables 10 – 11 
Table 10 shows the estimates for the parameters E1 when estimating the factor model (1)-(3) 
without the crisis parameters J. Table 11 then provides the estimates for J1 when allowing for 
shocks and instruments to exert a different effect on capital flows during the crisis. 
Table 10 indicates that – when estimating the model over both crisis and non-crisis periods – 
there are some systematic relationships between the quality of fundamentals or institutions, 
financial policies or openness, on the one hand, and the strength with which shocks affect 
global capital flows, on the other. The null hypothesis (shown in the second row of the table) 
consistent with a particular instrument Zi,t helping to reduce the effect of a specific shocks is in 
some cases confirmed, though the effects are modest in size. 
Looking at Table 11, this finding changes substantially when allowing for instruments to exert 
a different effect on the shock transmission during the crisis. The null hypothesis is confirmed 
in more than 9 out of 10 cases. For instance, a better sovereign rating reduces the negative 
effect of a crisis event and of changes in the Ted spread or in risk (i.e. J1 > 0 in Table 11). 
Similarly, the positive coefficients for US or domestic macro news (i.e. a negative macro shock 
triggering capital outflows) becomes smaller during the crisis for countries with a good 
sovereign rating. 
The same holds for several of the macroeconomic fundamentals and policy intervention 
variables, with the exception of FX reserves.
9 Moreover, comparing the estimates for J1 across 
shocks indicates that the instruments are more often statistically significant for common shocks 
(far fewer J1 are significant for the two idiosyncratic shocks). One interpretation of this is that 
these instruments do a better job in explaining the differences in the effects of common shocks 
than the effects of idiosyncratic shocks.
Figures 9 – 10 
A number of additional tests are presented in Figures 9-10, which aim to highlight the 
economic relevance of the determinants Zi,t in explaining differences in capital flows during the 
non-crisis and crisis times. Figure 9 shows the response patterns of capital flows to common 
shocks during the crisis for different country groupings, where countries are grouped according 
to the strength of their fundamentals and institutions or the openness of their economies. Figure 
10 shows a similar analysis for VIX changes, but also distinguishes between the pre-crisis and 
crisis transmissions. Both confirm that the differences in the strength of the shock transmission 
are quite substantial and of meaningful across fundamentals and institutions, yet are small for 
external exposure variables. Moreover, both sets of figures show dynamic response patterns by 
allowing for lagged effects of the shocks in the factor model (1)-(3), indicating that the effects 
exhibit some persistence for a number of weeks. 
In summary, the main finding of this sub-section is that country-specific fundamentals and 
institutions are important for explaining differences in capital flows, and in particular during the 
                                                
9 The only fundamental that persistently has the opposite sign from the null is for FX reserve holdings, 
implying that countries with high reserve holdings suffered larger capital outflows during the crisis and 
were also more exposed to common and idiosyncratic shocks. This is somewhat unexpected, but is 
consistent with the fact that countries with high reserve holdings are generally EMEs, i.e. those with 
poorer institutional quality. 22
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2007-08 crisis. More specifically, countries with a high institutional quality and strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals succeeded to insulate their financial markets from adverse 
common and idiosyncratic shocks during the financial crisis. By contrast, the external exposure 
of countries, either through trade or through finance, appears to have played at most a minor 
role in accounting for cross-country differences in the transmission of global shocks. 
4.3  Economic relevance of drivers associated with push versus pull factors 
The purpose of the final step of the analysis is to gauge the economic relevance of the identified 
effects and to compare the overall importance of different drivers associated with push factors 
versus pull factors in explaining global capital flows. 
Table 12 
Looking at the fitted values if the model is a first way to gauge how much of net capital flows 
can be accounted for by drivers associated with push factors – i.e. shocks that are common to 
all countries – and how much by drivers related to pull factors – i.e. factors specific to 
individual countries’ policies, institutions and fundamentals. Using the definitions of equations 
(4) and (5), Table 12 shows actual and fitted net capital flows during each of three sub-periods 
(pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis) against the fitted cumulated flows from the factor model (1)-
(3). The fitted net flows are also split up into a part explained by common factors 
G
t i f , ˆ  and a 
part accounted for by domestic factors 
D
t i f , ˆ , together with the shares of fitted net capital flows 









t i f f X , , , ˆ / ˆ   .
The main finding of Table 12 is that common factors are, overall, about as important as 
domestic factors as drivers as net capital flows over the period 2005-2010. However, there are 
some interesting differences across regions and over time. Importantly, while common factors 
appear to have been more important during the crisis – accounting for about 73% of net capital 
flows for the median country – domestic factors have come to dominate in explaining net 
capital flows since 2009. Looking at different regions, domestic factors have become particular 
important for EMEs in Latin America and Asia in the 2009-10 surge in capital flows to EMEs, 
accounting for most of the cumulated net capital flows during that period.  
A number of caveats apply to these calculations. Although the fit of the model (1)-(3) is overall 
good, relevant common or idiosyncratic drivers may be excluded from the model. Moreover, 
the comparison of the fit of the model with actual net capital flows is done for the whole of the 
three sub-periods, which implies that the numbers of Table 12 provide overall figures, while 
over shorter periods there may indeed be significant changes as to whether common factors or 
domestic factors drive capital flows. 
A second way to gauge the economic relevance of the drivers associated with various pull 
factors, is to estimate model (1)-(3) as an unconditional one in order to see whether and how the 
various country-specific determinants Zi,t may be related to capital flows at particular points in 
time. To do so, the factors St are dropped from the benchmark model, so that the model 
becomes: 
t i t i t i t t i e Z f E f , 1 , 1 , 1 , ' ] [       E      (6) 23
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Since Zi,t are slowly changing over time (many having annual or quarterly frequency) and 
capital flows tend to be highly volatile, an estimation with weekly frequency yields little 
information about the relationship between these determinants and capital flows. The 
estimation of (6) is therefore conducted for longer sub-periods of the crisis and periods around 
the crisis, in particular the pre-crisis period (12 October 2005 through 7 August 2007), the crisis 
(8 August 2007 – 14 March 2009) and the post-crisis period (15 March 2009 – 22 November 
2010) as discussed in section 2. Hence fi,t for this pure cross-section estimations are the 
cumulated, total capital flows to country i over each of these specific sub-periods. As before, 
the estimation follows an encompassing strategy starting from a full model including all 
determinants Zi,t and then in a stepwise procedure excluding variables that are not statistically 
significant at the 20% level, while also at each step testing whether already excluded variable 
become again statistically significant and need to be included.  
Table 13 
Table 13 shows the estimates of equation (6) for the three separate sub-periods. The columns 
labeled “decile” show the difference in the response of capital flows for a country with the 
determinant at its 90th percentile compared a country at its 10th percentile. The table again 
confirms the findings of the conditional analysis of the previous sub-section (where the analysis 
conditioned on various common or idiosyncratic shocks) that in particular countries with strong 
macro fundamentals and with good institutions experienced smaller outflows (or more capital 
inflows) during the crisis than countries with weak fundamentals and high country risk. More 
specifically, countries with a strong current account, a good fiscal position and relative lower 
short-term debt fared significantly better during the crisis in terms of capital flows. Among the 
institutional variables, it is in particular the sovereign rating and the quality of institutions that 
exerted a significant effect on capital flows during the crisis.  
Most importantly, the effects of fundamentals and institutional factors on capital flows are 
sizeable. What is striking for these two sets of variables is the change in the sign of the 
coefficients in the crisis compared to the pre- or post-crisis periods. It implies that countries that 
were relatively more risky – e.g. a lower sovereign rating, worse institutions or higher short-
term debt – experienced larger capital outflows during the crisis but also higher net inflows 
before and after the crisis. For instance, countries with a poor sovereign rating (10
th percentile) 
experienced 15.2% higher net capital outflows during the crisis but 9.2% larger net inflows in 
the 2009-10 recovery.  
By contrast, there is no systematic evidence that either trade or financial integration and 
exposure explain any of the cross-sectional differences in capital flows during the crisis. 
However, there is some indication that more financial open economies experienced somewhat 
larger capital outflows, though the point estimate is marginally insignificant. 
Figure 11 
Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between total cumulated capital flows and sovereign 
ratings and the institutional quality across countries. The figures show a quite striking switch in 
the sign in the link between capital flows and the determinants from the crisis period to the pre- 
and post-crisis periods. For instance, Figure 11 shows that while a better rating meant smaller 
capital outflows during the crisis, the opposite relationship held both before the crisis and 
during the 2009-10 recovery. This is indeed intuitive as we have seen that it was particularly 
EMEs, i.e. those with generally worse sovereign ratings, which experienced that sharpest 
declines in capital flows during the crisis, yet also the strongest increases in capital inflows 
before and after the crisis. A similar switch in sign in the relationship is observed for the and 
for the quality of domestic institutions (Panels B and D) as well as other variables (Table 13). 24
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5. Conclusions 
Global portfolio capital flows have exhibited a collapse and substantial shift during the height 
of the 2007-08 crisis, and an even more sustained surge since the beginning of 2009. The paper 
has analyzed the drivers behind this collapse and surge over the past few years, building on a 
novel, high-frequency database of fund-level flows in portfolio equities and bonds. It has 
attempted to shed light in particular on the debate whether it has been push factors or pull 
factors that have been the main drivers behind this global capital flow pattern for a broad set of 
50 advanced and emerging economies. 
The findings indicate that common shocks – such as specific crisis events, changes to global 
liquidity and risk conditions – have exerted a substantial effect on global capital flows. 
Moreover, the effects of such global factors have changed markedly during the crisis. In 
particular the rise in risk and important crisis events triggered a reallocation of flows from 
many EMEs to some AEs during the crisis, while they have had the opposite effect before and 
after the crisis, consistent with a “flight-to-safety” hypothesis during the crisis.  
The second main finding of the paper is that much of the cross-country heterogeneity to 
common shocks is related to country-specific determinants, and these effects are indeed 
economically meaningful.  
The empirical results have implications for the ongoing policy debate about the drivers of 
capital flows. A highly contentious issue is whether it is push factors – i.e. shocks in advanced 
economies and common to all economies, or rather pull factors – i.e. factors that are specific to 
countries themselves, which have been driving capital flows over the past few years. The 
findings of the paper indicate that push factors in the form of shocks to liquidity and risk as 
well as to macroeconomic conditions and policies in advanced economies, in particular the US, 
have indeed exerted a significant effect on capital flows to EMEs as well as other advanced 
economies. Although these effects have been larger during the 2007-08 crisis, they have 
continued to exert a sizeable effect on global capital flows also during the subsequent recovery. 
However, the findings of the paper also underline that the drivers of capital flows are strongly 
related to pull factors, and in particular countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals, institutions 
and policies, which in fact have been the dominant drivers of capital flows in the 2009-10 
recovery. By contrast, real and financial openness are found to play little or no role for the 
exposure and vulnerability of capital flows of countries to common global shocks emanating 
from advanced economies. Hence the implication of this finding is making the domestic 
economy more closed through capital controls may be largely ineffective, while it is rather 
sound macroeconomic policies and an improvement in the institutional setting that helps 
countries reduce their exposure to external shocks. 25
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Figure 1: Capital flows during the crisis 
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AE equity EME equity AE bond EME bond
Notes: The figures show the cumulated total capital flows (net capital flows in USD to total assets under management) 
relative to the beginning of the crisis (7 Aug. 2007 = 100), distinguishing between advanced and emerging economies 
(panel A) and by type of portfolio investment (Panel B). 
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Figure 6: Time-series evolution of US macroeconomic news, Ted spread and VIX 
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Notes: The figures show the evolution of US macroeconomic news (Panel A), Ted spread and VIX (Panel B). The latter 
two are normalized so as to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of unity. 33
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Figure 7: Goodness of fit – actual versus fitted capital flows in crisis 
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Notes: The figures show the actual cumulated flows during the crisis (vertical axis) against the fitted cumulated 
flows (horizontal axis) from the factor model (1)-(3). The figure in Panel A is based on the estimation of the model 
without crisis interaction terms and with common and idiosyncratic shocks; the figure in Panel B on the model with 
crisis interaction terms but without any common shocks; and the figure in Panel C both with crisis interaction terms 
and with common shocks. 35
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Notes: The figures show on the horizontal axis the response coefficients of portfolio capital flows to key crisis 
events for each of the countries in the sample; the vertical axis shows the values of the four respective determinants 
for each of the countries. 36
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Figure 9: Determinants of capital flows during crisis – dynamic effects 
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Figure 9 (cont.): Determinants of capital flows during crisis – dynamic effects 
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Notes: The figures show the dynamic response of portfolio capital flows over a window of 10 weeks – in Panel A 
to crisis events; in Panel B to US equity markets; and in Panel C to US macro shocks. The light/orange lines show 
the responses for countries with values above the cross-country average for the respective determinants; while the 
dark/blue lines show the corresponding responses for countries below the average. Dotted lines provide 90% 
confidence intervals. 38
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Figure 10: Determinants of effect of changes in risk on capital flows 
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Notes: The figures show the effects of changes in risk (VIX) on portfolio capital flows over a window of 4 weeks. Panel A only 
includes countries that have good fundamentals (high reserves, string current account position), good institutions (high 
sovereign rating, good political institutions), or are open to trade and finance, relative to the average of the cross-country 
distribution. Panel B includes those countries below these respective averages. The light/orange lines show the responses in the
non-crisis period, the dark/blue lines show those during the crisis. Dotted lines provide 90% confidence intervals. 39
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Table 1: EPFR fund-level portfolio flow database, November 2010 
A. Equity Funds Database Coverage 
Fund Group: # of Funds $US billions # of Funds $US billions # of Funds $US billions
Asia ex-Japan 1193 199 1211 206 1354 251
EMEA 479 40 487 42 543 42
GEM 743 251 745 272 866 322
Global 2989 752 3037 780 3908 1680
Japan 561 40 563 40 629 48
Latin America 229 50 231 54 236 63
Pacific 173 22 173 22 221 37
U S A 5 5 2 31 6 2 45 6 7 31 8 2 06 7 3 83 2 7 6
Western Europe 1940 315 1944 317 2218 443
TOTAL 13830 3294 14064 3552 16713 6163
Daily Report Weekly Report Monthly Report
B. Bond Funds Database Coverage
Fund Group: # of Funds $US billions # of Funds $US billions # of Funds $US billions
Balanced 476 244 491 261 639 584
Emerging Markets 645 69 664 80 736 96
Global 1309 330 1330 341 1541 677
High Yield 534 123 547 136 704 221
Money Market 1617 2620 1721 2885 1879 3322
USA 2256 635 2492 706 2853 1349
T O T A L 6 8 3 74 0 2 07 2 4 54 4 1 08 3 5 26 2 4 8
Daily Report Weekly Report Monthly Report41
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Table 2: Summary statistics of EPFR weekly and cumulated net capital flows 
Total Equity Bond Mean Mean Std.  dev. Pre-crisis Crisis (Lehman)
abs. flows (12/10/05-7/8/07) (14/8/08-14/3/09)
Argentina 6,663            1,940            4,722            0.50 0.15 0.64 28.53 -19.24
Australia 40,291          32,418          7,873            0.30 0.12 0.38 22.50 -5.38
Austria 8,679            5,262            3,417            0.37 -0.06 0.51 5.85 -5.78
Belgium 13,057          9,793            3,264            0.24 -0.05 0.32 6.45 -7.49
Brazil 136,570        117,967        18,603          0.50 0.19 0.66 29.19 -5.85
Canada 96,863          65,210          31,653          0.29 0.05 0.43 11.32 -7.84
Chile 7,802            6,021            1,781            0.52 0.21 0.65 27.99 -0.70
China 170,449        168,416        2,033            0.62 0.21 0.83 39.23 -0.29
Colombia 4,773            1,122            3,651            0.60 0.22 0.77 29.79 -21.79
Czech Republic 3,140            2,525            615               0.36 -0.09 0.52 -7.21 -14.66
Denmark 11,022          9,772            1,251            0.19 -0.03 0.26 10.53 -4.34
Egypt 4,394            3,474            920               0.44 0.13 0.56 4.96 -8.10
Finland 9,733            8,473            1,260            0.24 -0.06 0.32 9.15 -4.84
France 113,449        100,294        13,155          0.21 -0.05 0.28 8.44 -2.97
Germany 141,035        112,715        28,320          0.39 -0.01 0.79 7.57 -5.23
Greece 1,711            1,530            182               0.27 -0.06 0.39 8.36 -5.72
Hong Kong 50,073          48,406          1,667            0.36 0.09 0.47 21.02 -6.94
Hungary 6,292            2,827            3,466            0.48 -0.08 0.66 -8.19 -21.15
India 79,137          77,677          1,460            0.46 0.12 0.62 14.75 -5.80
Indonesia 28,660          17,997          10,663          0.41 0.13 0.50 12.48 -13.23
Ireland 10,079          6,248            3,830            0.25 -0.04 0.35 9.33 -7.00
Italy 37,082          19,854          17,228          0.26 -0.06 0.35 8.36 -6.72
Israel 5,766            5,477            289               0.54 0.07 0.36 4.71 -3.22
Japan 148,805        112,023        36,782          0.28 -0.05 0.37 10.28 -10.41
Kazakhstan 3,474            840               2,634            0.55 0.13 0.67 18.65 -19.40
Korea 75,450          67,651          7,799            0.38 0.12 0.47 13.06 -4.11
Lithuania 1,861            18                 1,843            0.63 0.16 0.79 -0.62 -9.78
Malaysia 16,664          11,295          5,369            0.45 0.13 0.54 13.36 -6.72
Mexico 36,845          24,840          12,006          0.49 0.14 0.59 25.65 -8.84
Netherlands 46,010          35,096          10,914          0.21 -0.03 0.28 8.45 -4.56
New Zealand 2,192            188               2,004            0.29 0.08 0.51 15.36 -9.27
Norway 14,530          11,039          3,490            0.21 -0.01 0.33 11.29 -2.77
Peru 8,534            4,072            4,462            0.52 0.21 0.62 28.67 -14.98
Philippines 6,887            3,494            3,393            0.46 0.15 0.59 17.23 -18.24
Poland 16,055          7,067            8,988            0.47 -0.05 0.64 -8.41 -17.47
Portugal 1,784            1,659            125               0.24 -0.02 0.35 0.89 -3.44
Romania 561               333               228               0.53 -0.17 0.77 -8.22 -28.91
Russia 60,074          51,891          8,183            0.48 0.11 0.63 7.61 -11.35
Saudi Arabia 1,306            728               578               0.62 0.17 1.05 3.44 -18.08
Singapore 19,199          17,403          1,796            0.36 0.08 0.49 29.79 -11.58
South Africa 34,627          26,358          8,269            0.37 0.12 0.47 6.51 -0.49
Spain 27,596          22,037          5,559            0.25 -0.04 0.33 9.53 -3.55
Sweden 23,978          19,003          4,975            0.24 -0.01 0.31 13.03 -5.97
Switzerland 106,005        97,410          8,595            0.22 -0.02 0.40 8.56 -1.84
Taiwan 59,590          59,370          220               0.36 0.03 0.46 4.49 -3.93
Thailand 18,245          16,253          1,992            0.42 0.11 0.54 10.84 -5.96
Turkey 25,848          19,354          6,494            0.48 0.07 0.63 7.46 -16.67
UK 210,590        178,471        32,119          0.18 0.00 0.24 9.50 -2.27
USA 2,935,701     1,870,097     1,065,604     0.21 0.02 0.27 -0.51 -0.78
Vietnam 1,661            1,149            512               0.47 0.27 0.79 22.67 -6.69
Weekly net capital flows,        
% of AUM
Cumulated net capital 
flows,       % of AUM
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Table 3: Summary statistics of shocks 
A. Definitions and summary statistics 
Variable Definition / Unit Obs. Mean std. dev.
Crisis events Dummy variable 8
Liquidity - TED Ted spread, standardised 13300 0.000 1.000
Risk - VIX VIX, orthog.to Ted, standardised 13300 0.000 1.000
US macro shock Composite of indiv. US shocks 266 0.0013 0.0746
Domestic macro shock Composite of indiv. dom. shocks 13300 -0.0004 0.0157
US equity returns Weekly % returns, USD 266 0.0369 2.7062
Domestic equity returns Weekly % returns, LC, orthog to US 13300 0.0000 3.2870
Individual US macro shocks:
GDP Quarterly YoY % change 56 0.071 0.407
Consumer confidence index (around 100) 174 0.009 0.193
Housing starts Monthly, in 1000 169 0.037 0.269
Industrial production MoM % change 150 -0.031 0.765
NAPM / ISM index (around 50) 172 -0.018 0.382
NF payroll employment MoM change (100,000) 175 -0.001 0.007
Retail sales in % 152 -0.024 0.842
Trade balance in USD billion 175 0.001 0.138
Unemployment in % 111 -0.018 0.115
Individual domestic macro shocks:
Trade balance in USD billion 2021 0.007 1.429
GDP Quarterly YoY % change 983 0.015 0.392
Industrial production MoM % change 2129 -0.029 0.416
Unemployment in % 1675 -0.009 0.112
Sources: Bloomberg for all individual macro shocks as well as for equity returns (MSCI market indices).
B. List of crisis events 
date event
09 August 2007 First incidence of major liquidity squeeze in global money markets
14 March 2008 Bear Stearns near collapse - Fed arranges financing with JPMorgan Chase
13 July 2008 U.S. Treasury Department announces increase of credit lines of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers declares bankruptcy, the largest ever in the United States
29 September 2008 U.S. House Rejects $700 Billion Financial-Rescue Plan
27 October 2008 Iceland's Kaupthing Bank Defaults on Its Samurai Bonds as Yields Hit 450%
14 November 2008 Freddie Mac Posts Record Loss, Asks Treasury for $13.8 Billion
09 December 2008 Goldman, UBS, Deutsche Bank Among 12 Banks Lowered by S&P
















Liquidity - TED 0.2849 1
Risk - VIX 0.1317 0 1
US macro shock -0.0048 -0.0538 0.0205 1
Domestic macro shock 0.0127 -0.0123 -0.0234 0.0139 1
US equity returns -0.1094 -0.2399 -0.1434 -0.0762 0.027 1
Domestic equity returns -0.0907 -0.0284 -0.035 0.0437 -0.0062 0 143
ECB
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Table 13: Determinants of portfolio capital flows – Cross-country estimations 
coef. s.e. decile coef. s.e. decile coef. s.e. decile
Macro fundamentals
Growth 1.708** 0.805 11.22 0.808 0.509 5.31
FX reserves -0.083* 0.046 -2.43
Current account 0.253* 0.135 5.42
Fiscal balance 0.650 0.386 6.50 0.201** 0.095 2.01 0.418** 0.198 4.18
Inflation 1.100 0.717 7.98 0.457* 0.245 3.31
ST interest rate 0.882 0.648 5.46
Public debt -0.238** 0.095 -6.99
Short-term debt 0.278 0.211 8.45 -0.203*** 0.055 -6.08 0.197* 0.101 5.99
Bank credit growth
Institutions
Sovereign rating -1.202* 0.596 -14.40 1.271*** 0.291 15.25 -0.779*** 0.27 -9.24
Rating change 8.688*** 2.253 8.688 -3.620* 1.984 -3.62
Financial institutions




Deposit guarantees 6.235** 3.007 6.235 -9.461* 5.214 -9.46
Debt guarantees 5.998** 2.323 5.998
Asset relief
Capital injection 3.014 1.866 3.014 -8.023*** 2.2 -8.02
Exposure




KA openness -3.098** 1.488 -11.23 -0.612 0.74 -2.22 -1.125 0.785 -4.07
Constant 15.151*** 21.128 3.584 -28.071*** 5.269 5.269 32.883*** 4.524 4.524
Observations 49 49 49
R-squared 0.52 0.71 0.78
Crisis Post-crisis
12 Oct 2005 -                
7 Aug 2007
8 Aug 2007 -                 
14 Mar 2009
15 Mar 2009 -                
22 Nov 2010
Pre-crisis
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for the cross-section estimation of i i i e Z f     ' E D , across the full set of 
countries, with fi the size of capital flows (net capital flows in USD relative to total assets under management at the beginning 
of the period, in %) and Zi as a vector of independent variables. The estimation follows a backward stepwise procedure, where 
in each step the least significant variable is dropped (while in each step also testing whether already excluded variables become 
again significant at the 20% level), so that in the final encompassing model only variables significant at the 15% level are 
included. The table shows estimates for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. The column labelled “decile” shows the
difference in the response of capital flows for a country with the determinant at its 90th percentile compared a country at its
10th percentile. As most of the common shocks are US variables, note that the US is excluded from all model estimations. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo